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COMMENTS
AS A SEPARATE REGIME
Only the convenience of the parties to the lease, or of the
court which must interpret it, seems to require that shut-in pay-
ments be treated as either royalties or rentals. The parties ap-
parently are free to create separate or hybrid regimes by incor-
porating into the lease their own rules governing problems such
as distribution of the shut-in payments, termination for non-
payment, and the others which are so conveniently handled by
analogy to royalties or rentals.
CONCLUSION
In Davis v. Laster the court chose to resolve a controversy
arising under a shut-in clause by characterizing shut-in pay-
ments as royalty. Since this characterization was derived from
the terms of the lease, Davis does not foreclose a contractual at-
tempt to classify shut-in payments as rentals or to create a sep-
arate regime for them. Rental characterization should prevent
nonparticipating royalty owners from sharing in shut-in pay-
ments, but should have no effect on the lessee's diligent develop-
ment obligation or interruption of prescription on nonpartici-
pating royalty interests.
Gordon R. Crawford and William Shelby McKenzie
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION - SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION
IN JURY SELECTION
Due process and equal protection of the law under the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
no distinction shall be made in the selection of grand or petit
juries on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude.1 This guarantee, which is also incorporated in the Louisi-
ana Constitution 2 and Code of Criminal Procedure,3 is denied by
1. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) established this principle. Sub-
sequent Supreme Court cases elaborating this proposition include: Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940) ; Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) ; Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398 (1945) ; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) ; Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282 (1950); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559 (1953) ; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) ; Eubanks v. Louisi-
ana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
3. LA. R.S. 15:172 (1950).
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systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries. 4 What constitutes
systematic exclusion has caused courts much difficulty since the
inquiry is basically factual, with each case presenting several
important variables, the summation of which determines the
issue. Although comprehensive rules are lacking, notwithstand-
ing a great amount of litigation, it is possible to analyze the
variables bearing on the question of systematic exclusion with-
in the framework of certain general principles.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
It will not suffice that the written laws of a state promise
no discrimination; the fourteenth amendment requires that
equal protection actually be given.5 Thus local tradition cannot
justify failure to comply with the constitutional mandate.6
To object to exclusion, a defendant must be a member of the
excluded class.7 He has no right to demand inclusion of a mem-
ber of his race on a particular jury as he is not guaranteed in-
clusion but the absence of systematic exclusion." Nor may he
object to the state's use of its peremptory challenges to exclude
members of his race called for jury service.9
Louisiana's jurisprudence is well settled that objections to
the composition of grand or petit juries are waived unless made
before trial.' While the United States Supreme Court has not
specifically ruled on this question," a recent federal case held
failure to make a timely objection to systematic exclusion did
4. See note 1 supra.
5. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
6. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 588 (1958).
7. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947). The court stated that it had
never entertained a defendant's objection to exclusions from the jury except when
he was a member of the excluded class, but refused to decide whether lack of iden-
tity with an excluded group would alone defeat an otherwise well-established
case. See Slovenko, The Jury System in Louisiana Criminal Law, 17 LA. L. REV.
655, 686 (1956) for an analytical discussion of this area.
8. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) ; State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928,
954, 22 So. 2d 273, 281 (1945) ; State v. Augusta, 199 La. 896, 912, 7 So. 2d 177,
183 (1942). It should be noted that the same principles which forbid discrimi-
nation in the selection of petit juries also govern the selection of grand juries.
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 362 (1939).
9. State v. Anderson, 206 La. 986, 20 So. 2d 288 (1944).
10. State v. White, 193 La. 775, 192 So. 345 (1939). See The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1944 Term - Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, 6 LA. L. REV. 173, 187 (1944).
11. While the United States Supreme Court has not ruled that objections must
be made before trial, no cases were found where the Supreme Court ruled on the
systematic exclusion issue when objection was not made before trial.
[Vol. XXlV
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not preclude consideration in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings.12
FACTORS DETERMINING SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION
Though no one factor can be considered determinative, the
jurisprudence indicates several which are important in conclud-
ing whether systematic exclusion was present.
Period of Time
To constitute unlawful discrimination, systematic exclusion
need not have continued for any extended period nor been prac-
ticed by a succession of jury commissioners. 18 However, absence
of Negro jurors despite available qualified Negro citizens cre-
ates a presumption of discrimination 14 which requires the state
to prove non-discrimination. 15 The United States Supreme Court
has indicated the state's proof must go beyond mere assertions
of performance of duty by officials.'6
In the absence of a prima facie case additional factors which
indicate discrimination must be proved.
Effort by Commissioners
Louisiana places primary responsibility for the selection of
jurors in a jury commission 17 which must, without racial dis-
crimination, select qualified jurors.18 When jury commissioners
12. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1959).
13. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950). The court after quoting from
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) stated: "The existence of the kind of dis-
crimination described in the Hill case does not depend upon systematic exclusion
continuing over a long period and practiced by a succession of jury commission-
ers. Since the issue must be whether there has been discrimination in the selec-
tion of the jury that has indicted petitioner, it is enough to have direct evidence
based on the statements of the jury commissioners in the very case. Discrimina-
tion may be proved in other ways than by evidence of long-continued unexplained
absence of Negroes from many panels."
14. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Slovenko, The Jury System in
Louisiana Criminal Law, 17 LA. L. Rzv. 655, 687 (1956).
15. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953). When a prima facie case
is made out the burden falls on the state to bring in sufficient evidence to dispel
it.
16. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935). "If . .. the mere general
assertions by officials of their performance of duty were to be accepted as an
adequate justification for the complete exclusion of Negroes from jury service, the
constitutional provision -adopted with special reference to their protection-
would be but a vain and illusory requirement."
17. LA. R.S. 15:180 (1950) : "Immediately after completing the general venire
list, the commission shall select therefrom the names of twenty citizens, possessing
the qualifications of grand jurors .... ." Id. 15:181 provides for the drawing of
petit jurors by the jury commission.
18. Id. 15:172: "The qualifications to serve as a grand juror or a petit juror
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limit their selection to personal acquaintances, unconstitutional
discrimination can automatically arise from commissioners who
know no Negroes. 19 If Negro representation has been small,
the courts often look to the effort made by the commission to
obtain qualified Negroes. In State v. Anderson20 the court found
there had been a systematic exclusion of Negroes. The opinion
stressed the lack of effort made by the commissioners to find
qualified Negroes and indicated their duty was to make such an
effort.21 Conversely, in State v. Dorsey,2 wherein the court
found no systematic exclusion, the opinion emphasized the good
faith effort made by the jury commission, which used registra-
tion rolls, directories, newspapers, insurance lists, federal jury
rolls, and lists from colored organizations to obtain qualified
Negroes. 23
Selection Procedure
The United States Supreme Court has been extremely reluc-
tant to sustain charges of discrimination based solely on a selec-
tion procedure set out by state law, 24 while it has sustained nu-
merous objections to discriminatory practices by the persons in
charge of effectuating such a plan. 5 Any practice which mere-
in any of the courts of this state shall be as follows: To be a citizen of this
state, not less than twenty-one years of age, a 'bona fide resident of the parish
in and for which the court is holden, for one year next preceding such service,
able to read and write the English language, not under interdiction or charged
with any offense, or convicted at any time of any felony, provided that there shall
be no distinction made on account of race, color or previous condition of servi-
tude; and provided further, that the district judge shall have discretion to decide
upon the competency of jurors in particular cases where from physical infirmity
or from relationship, or other causes, the person may be, in the opinion of the
judge, incompetent to sit upon the trial of any particular case. In addition to the
foregoing qualifications, jurors shall be persons of well known good character and
standing in the community."
19. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940): "Where jury commissioners
limit those from whom grand juries are selected to their own personal acquaint-
ance, discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no negroes as well
as from Commissioners who know but eliminate them. If there has been discrim-
ination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot
stand."
20. 205 La. 710, 18 So. 2d 33 (1944).
21. Id. at 728, 18 So. 2d at 39: "The State made no effort to have the com-
missioners narrate the manner or way in which they selected the 300 names placed
in the general venire box. They do not say they made any investigation, inquiry
or effort to determine how many negroes were qualified to serve as grand and
petit jurors. Thus, in the administration of the law, they failed to perform a
duty placed upon them by the constitutional provisions in question as construed
and applied by the highest court in our land."
22. 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
23. Id. at 944, 22 So. 2d at 278.
24. See, e.g., Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947).
25. E.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) ; Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85 (1955) ; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) ; Cassell v. Texas, 339
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ly presents an opportunity to discriminate is scrutinized by the
court.26 For example, in Avery v. Georgia27 white and yellow
tickets were used to distinguish white and colored persons dur-
ing the selection process. Although no specific act of discrimi-
nation was proven in the selection procedure, the court, im-
pressed with the opportunities presented to various officials to
discriminate and the absence of Negroes selected, held there had
been systematic exclusion. 28
No statute specifies what sources Louisiana jury commis-
sioners are to use in selecting qualified jurors.29 Various ones
have been adopted without any uniformity among different
commissions.3" The most controversial has been the use of voter
registration rolls. Although such practice could be highly dis-
criminatory in some Louisiana parishes, it has not been disap-
proved. In State v. Perkins31 the voter registration rolls were
used in a parish containing 540 Negro as compared to 34,000
white voters. The court, in upholding the use of registration
rolls, reasoned that the qualifications for an elector and a juror
were substantially the same in Louisiana.3 2 Although it has been
suggested that the United States Supreme Court in Patton v. Mis-
sissippi approved voter qualification as a reasonable requisite
to jury service,38 it cannot be said with certainty that the Court
would uphold Perkins under present standards.
U.S. 282 (1950) ; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) ; Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
26. See note 25 supra.
27. 345 U.S. 559 (1953). After the names of prospective jurors had been select-
ed by jury commissioners, the names of white persons were printed on white
tickets and the names of Negroes on yellow tickets, which were placed together
in a jury box. A judge then drew a number of tickets from the box. He testified,
without contradiction, that he had not discriminated in the drawing. The tickets
drawn were handed to a sheriff, who entrusted them to a clerk, whose duty it
was to "arrange" the tickets and to type in final form the list of persons to be
called to serve on the panel. About 60 persons were on the panel from which the
jury was selected, but there were no Negroes.
28. Ibld.
29. See note 18 supra.
30. Several of the numerous sources used include: directories, newspapers, in-
surance lists, tax lists, registration rolls, and federal jury rolls.
31. 211 La. 993, 31 So. 2d 188 (1947).
32. The court said: "Article 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
require that a person be a registered voter in order to qualify for jury service.
However, since the qualifications set forth in Article 172 with respect to age, resi-
dence, literacy and other requirements for jury service are substantially the same
as those of an elector, the Jury Commission has found it is convenient to obtain its
general venire list from the registration roll. This has been a long established
custom and we do not find anything objectionable in the practice." Id. at 1005,
31 So. 2d at 192. See also State v. Mack, 243 La. 369, 144 So. 2d 363 (1962),
which recently approved the use of voter registration lists.
33. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947). See Comment, 8 LA. L. REv.
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Uncertainty and lack of uniformity in sources of selection
point to the need for a legislative declaration of more specific
selection procedure.
Economic and Educational Considerations
Often factors such as illiteracy and the inability of low wage
earners to leave their jobs for jury service result in a small
number of Negro veniremen despite a conscientious effort to
secure fair representation. 4 Although this would probably
never justify a total absence of Negro representation, the courts
have indicated these standards will be considered in determin-
ing whether a fair number of Negroes have been included on the
jury lists.3 5 In Brown v. Allen"6 the United States Supreme
Court recognized that a disproportionate number of white citi-
zens were on the jury lists, "doubtless due to inequality of edu-
cational and economic opportunities. 3 7
In the future, as the Negro continues to improve his educa-
tional and economic standards, this factor should depreciate in
importance.
Percentages
Generally, percentages alone are not enough to show the sys-
tematic exclusion of Negroes.3 8 The evolution of a conception
of due process or equal protection that requires proportional
548, 551 (1948) for a discussion of the court's failure to strike down the Missis-
sippi statute which approved of the use of voter rolls. The Supreme Court ap-
proved the use of tax lists in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In regard
to the use of tax lists the court stated: "Our duty to protect the federal constitu-
tional rights of all does not mean we must or should impose on states our con-
ception of the proper source of jury lists, so long as the source reasonably reflects
a cross-section of the population suitable in character and intelligence for that
civic duty. Short of an annual census or required population registration, these
tax lists offer the most comprehensive source of available names. We do not think
a use, nondiscriminatory as to race, of the tax lists violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor can we conclude on the evidence adduced that the results of
the use require a conclusion of unconstitutionality." Id. at 474.
34. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term -
Criminal Procedure, 13 LA. L. REV. 326, 331 (1953).
35. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 950, 22 So. 2d 273, 280 (1945) : "[W]e are
convinced from a careful reading of all the testimony that a fair percentage of the
members of the colored race was contained therein (referring to a list of 1360
names), especially when we take into consideration the economic, the moral, the
educational, and other general conditions prevailing among the colored race in the
Parish of Orleans."
36. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
37. Id. at 473.
38. "Purposeful discrimination is not sustained by a showing that on a single
grand jury the number of members of one race is less than that race's propor-
tion of the eligible individuals." Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).
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representation is in practicality precluded by the number of
races and nationalities.
Percentage discrepancies which show very little Negro rep-
resentation could become important when combined with other
factors. For example, percentages may be significant to prove
discrimination when a sizeable and unexplained disproportion
is shown to have existed for a number of years.39
Token Inclusion
The sporadic inclusion of Negroes is not sufficient to defeat
a claim of systematic exclusion. However, courts often have dif-
ficulty distinguishing token inclusion from unavailability of
qualified Negroes. In Cassell v. Texas40 token inclusion was evi-
dent since only one Negro had been placed on each of twenty-one
successive grand jury lists. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
statement that "the basis of selection cannot consciously take
color into account" 41 created a difficult problem; commissioners
frequently consciously included Negroes in an effort to meet,
not defeat, the constitutional requiremnts.4 2 The Louisiana Su-
preme Court in State v. Green43 subsequently declared that there
is not a token inclusion just because jury commissioners are con-
scious of including members of the colored race in order to com-
ply with the due process and equal protection requirements of
the fourteenth amendment. 44
"The Constitution forbids discrimination; it does not deal with percentages. Per-
centages may be of value in cases where no representation exists or where token
representation has been given in keeping with a scheme to deny equal protection
of the laws." State v. Perkins, 211 La. 993, 1007, 31 So. 2d 188, 192 (1947).
39. As the number of Negroes serving increases, or the period of the exclu-
sion decreases, the value of the percentage as proof is diminished until an un-
known point is reached where it becomes merely a convenient manifestation of
discrimination which must otherwise be proved. See Comment, 8 LA. L. REV. 548,
549 (1948).
40. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
41. Id. at 295.
42. See 19 LA. L. REV. 421 (1959) ; 13 LA. L. REV. 330 (1953) ; 11 LA. L.
REV. 241 (1951) for a discussion of the problem created.
43. 221 La. 713, 60 So. 2d 208 (1952).
44. The court's words were: "It would be fallacious, we think, to hold that,
because jury commissioners, being conscious of the necessity of giving considera-
tion to members of the colored race, as well as those of other races, in the selection
of all juries in order to comply with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution, have purposely included Negroes on a jury panel,
their forthright action constitutes discrimination in the absence of a showing that
there was a planned limitation upon the number of Negroes to be chosen." Id. at
726, 60 So. 2d at 212.
In State v. Mack, 243 La. 369, 144 So. 2d 363 (1962) the court reiterated this
principle by stating knowledge of a prospective juror's race on the part of the
jury commission is inevitable under Louisiana's system of selection.
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CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of a jury selection system is tested by
weighing the various factors outlined above - duration of un-
represented period, efforts by commissioners to obtain repre-
sentative juries, fairness of selection procedure, economic and
educational circumstances, proportionality of representation
and whether the representation is token. While each case must
be decided on its own merits, knowledge of these factors should
aid the attainment of constitutional jury selection.*
Byron Kantrow, Jr.
*The recent decision of Collins v. Walker, 242 La. 704, 138 So. 2d 546 (1962),
conviction set aside, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, No. 20537
(Dec. 6, 1963), was rendered at the time this Comment was set for publication.
It held a Negro defendant's constitutional rights were violated by a forthright
effort to include an ample number of Negroes on the grand jury. This case has
not yet been published and will be noted in a subsequent issue of this Review.
